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Abstract 
This paper examines whether contacts between caseworkers in public employment offices 
and employers impact on the reemployment chances of the unemployed they counsel. This 
analysis is made possible through a large administrative dataset on unemployed combined 
with an extensive survey of caseworkers' characteristics and their strategies. This data was 
created for evaluating public employment services in Switzerland. We use econometric 
techniques from the treatment evaluation literature to identify causal effects of a more 
intense employer focus of the caseworkers. The estimation results indicate that caseworkers 
who maintain direct contacts to firms achieve higher reintegration rates. 
 
Keywords 




A  Introduction 
This  paper  examines,  whether  a  network  between  employment  offices'  caseworkers  and 
employers affects the re-employment chances of the unemployed. Direct contacts to employers 
might provide caseworkers with additional information on vacancies, skill requirements, and 
current developments in the local labour market. This information and the direct relationship 
itself may assist the placement of the unemployed. On the other hand, employer contacts also 
consume a substantial share of caseworkers' time, which otherwise could have been spent on 
other activities. To analyse this trade-off, we examine the impact of a direct relationship between 
caseworkers and employers on the employment chances of their unemployed clients. We find 
that caseworkers who maintain such networks with firms achieve higher employment rates. In 
particular, the less skilled of their unemployed clients benefit most. 
Public employment services are supposed to assist in the matching of unemployed to employers 
and  thereby  reduce  the  unemployment  rate.  Given  the  large  public  expenditures  devoted  to 
employment  services,  there  is  a  considerable  interest  in  enhancing  their  effectiveness.
1  One 
channel that has received public attention recently is the attitude towards employers. In recent 
years, several countries progressively entered the employers as an additional client group besides 
unemployed  and  jobseekers.  Caseworkers  no  longer  focus  mainly  only  on  counselling,  job 
search training and other active labour market programmes, placement, verification of job search 
efforts and imposing sanctions if needed, but engage in direct contacts with firms. Private firms 
and  companies  are  courted  by  caseworkers  in  an  attempt  to  encourage  the  registration  of 
vacancies and to brighten the image of unemployed persons. This focus on employers received 
increasing attention in Germany, UK, Switzerland, and other countries. In Germany, jobcentres 
should devote at least 20 percent of their placement capacities to employers, introduce so-called 
employer managers as a new staff position, and segment employers into different types of client 
groups (Schütz and Ochs, 2005). In the UK, the employer service directorate was set up in 
2001/2002  to  engage  with  employers  in  making  public  jobcentres  the  preferred  recruitment 
channel (Bunt, McAndrew, and Kuechel, 2005). Not only are caseworkers asked to establish and 
                                                           
1   For recent studies on the effectiveness of active labour market programmes, see e.g. Wunsch and Lechner (2007) 
for Germany and Lechner and Wiehler (2006) for Austria.   2 
maintain direct, even personal relationships with firms and their human resources departments, 
they are also encouraged to endorse the firms’ perspective and particular needs, which may even 
be considered as a marketing strategy to improve the image of the public employment offices. In 
this paper, we examine whether a more intensive employer focus increases the employment 
chances of the unemployed. Due to data availability, we focus on Switzerland. 
This paper also contributes to the literature on effective organization of public institutions, where 
the lack of market competition does not ensure that only the most effective organizational forms 
survive.  Asymmetric  information  and  conflicting  goals  may  hinder  achieving  optimal 
organization forms in this principal-agent relationship. External evaluations may therefore be 
needed to provide guidance on improving organizational structures. The effectiveness of public 
employment  services  has  been  analyzed  from  a  macroeconometric  perspective,  e.g.  by 
estimating job-vacancy matching functions as in Berman (1997). Only little empirical research 
has  taken  a  microeconometric  perspective.  Sheldon  (2003)  and  Vassiliev  et  al.  (2006),  for 
instance, analyse the efficiency of Swiss employment offices by linking input factors such as the 
number  of  counsellors  to  performance  measures.  Although  both  studies  find  considerable 
inefficiencies,
2 they are not able to explain fully the differences between efficient and inefficient 
offices. This paper complements this type of research by analysing whether employer contacts 
affect efficiency by changing the reemployment chances for the unemployment. 
In the next section, we describe the institutional details for Switzerland and explore reasons why 
the intensity and the form of the caseworker to employer interaction might be an important 
determinant  of  job  finding  rates.  In  section  C,  we  describe  the  data  set,  which  consists  of 
administrative data linking unemployed, caseworkers, and employment offices, complemented 
with  an  extensive  survey  of  all  Swiss  caseworkers  asking  about  their  characteristics  and 
strategies.  Section  D  provides  descriptive  statistics,  and  Section  E  explains  the  concept  of 
causality  and  the  identification  strategy  used.  It  also  presents  briefly  the  propensity  score 
matching estimator used to disentangle causal effects from correlations. The empirical results are 
presented in Section F, which suggest that unemployed persons indeed benefit from a direct link 
between caseworkers to firms. Three appendices provide further details on the econometrics and 
the empirical results. 
                                                           
2 Sheldon finds that placement offices reached roughly two thirds of their efficiency potential. Vassiliev et al. (2006) 
find a mean inefficiency on the order of 15% of best observed performance.   3 
B  The Swiss public employment services 
B.1  The Swiss unemployment insurance system 
Until the recession of the early 1990s, unemployment was very low in Switzerland, a small 
country  with  26  different  administrative  regions,  called  cantons.  With  the  recession,  the 
unemployment rate rose rapidly to more than 5% (see Figure 1). This triggered a comprehensive 
revision of the federal unemployment insurance act in 1996/1997. With this revision, the about 
3000  municipal  unemployment  offices  were  consolidated  to  a  smaller  number  of  regional 
employment offices (REO). Compared to the previous municipal offices, which were largely 
concerned  with  administering  unemployment  benefits,  these  regional  offices,  of  which  there 
were about 110 employment offices
3 operating in 2003, aimed at providing professional services 
with respect to counselling, placement, activation, and training.  


































Note: Monthly unemployment rate. Source: Swiss national bank (Monatshefte). 
The  federal  State  Secretariat  for  Economic  Affairs  (seco)  established  four  targets  that  the 
employment  offices  should  pursue  with  respect  to  'their'  unemployed  clients:  rapid  de-
registration,  prevention  of  long-term  unemployment,  prevention  of  benefit  exhaustion  and 
                                                           
3   For  reasons  explained  below,  we  will  focus  on  only  103  employment  offices  and  their  caseworkers.  We 
incorporate neither the employment offices in Geneva nor Appenzell-Innerrhoden, nor those employment offices 
that were newly established in early 2003.   4 
prevention of re-registration. In order to achieve these targets, well-trained caseworkers provide 
counselling  and  placements  services  and  assign  active  labour  market  programmes  such  as 
subsidized employment or training to the unemployed to qualify them for the requirements of 
employers. Unemployed persons are requested to accept any suitable job-offer, to participate in 
assigned labour market programmes, and to exhibit sufficient search effort. Otherwise, sanctions 
in  the  form  of  benefit  cuts  could  be  imposed.  Another  important  activity  of  caseworkers  is 
establishing and strengthening contacts to (local) employers. 
B.2  Caseworker interactions with employers 
Caseworkers  vary  with  regard  to  their  employer  interactions  in  two  aspects:  Intensity  and 
channels  of  contact.  Depending  on  the  size  and  organisational  structure  of  the  employment 
office, some caseworker have direct, more intensive contacts to employers, while others have 
rather  indirect  contacts.  The  latter  comprehends  intermediation  channels  such  as  vacancies 
posted  in  newspapers  or  on  the  Internet.  It  also  comprehends  a  specialization  within  the 
employment  office,  where  some  caseworkers  specialize  on  maintaining  close  contacts  to 
employers while the other caseworkers use them as intermediaries. Caseworkers differ also in 
their perception of the role of employers: some caseworkers consider them as an additional client 
group, which should be offered good services. Others would not regard the employers as a client 
group by itself but rather consider employer contacts only as a means to offer better services to 
their unemployed. 
One may ask whether a caseworker should devote a share of his time to direct employer contacts. 
A more intensive contact to employers could provide caseworkers with additional insights on the 
job market. Such an informal knowledge might assist caseworkers in matching unemployed to 
appropriate employers. Caseworkers might also gain some private information on job openings 
or receive information earlier. On the other hand, contacting employers is time consuming and 
thus  reduces  the  amount  of  time  available  for  counselling,  consolation  in  case  of  personal 
problems, psychological backing, controlling, and sanctions, etc. Other sources of information, 
e.g.  the  Internet  or  Intranet,  might  be  more  efficient  for  placing  unemployed  or  updating 
knowledge on the current labour market situation. 
Another  question  concerns  the  optimal  form  of  the  interaction  between  employers  and 
caseworkers.  In  Switzerland,  employers  are  not  obliged  to  register  open  vacancies  with  the 
employment  offices.  If  the  employment  office  aims  for  an  active  placement  strategy,  it  is   5 
important  that  the  potential  employers  consider  the  employment  office  to  offer  a  useful 
placement channel. There is anecdotal evidence that at least some employment offices initially 
pursued a strategy that was in contrast to the employer's interests: By assigning job placements to 
unemployed persons frequently, they attempted to force individuals to search harder for jobs and 
imposed sanctions if the unemployed person did reject too many job placements. This strategy, 
however, increased the administrative burden on the side of the employers, which received a 
large number of inadequate or unmotivated unemployed. Thus, employers became reluctant to 
contact employment offices for filling vacancies. Over time, the annoyance of the firms reduced 
the leeway of the employment offices. This then induced a gradual shift of the employment 
offices  towards  a  more  employer  friendly  attitude,  which,  of  course,  in  turn  jeopardises  the 
instrument of forced job placements for exerting pressure. This shift in orientation, however, was 
not centrally enacted. It took place in different locations at different times and different paces.
4 
We exploit these differences in the employer focus and the handling of employer contacts across 
employment  offices  in  2003  to  estimate  their  effects  on  the  employment  chances  of  their 
unemployed until December 2006. Figure 1 showed that the unemployment rate was relatively 
stable in that period such that any changes in our estimated effects over time are unlikely to be a 
simple reflection of changes in the business cycle but rather can be interpreted as short-term 
                                                           
4   The federal level of the unemployment insurance system pursues a relatively clear vision focussing on active 
labour market policies and rapid placement. However, in Switzerland the cantons, which enjoy financial and 
political autonomy in many fields, have substantial leeway in the implementation and the organisation of 'their' 
employment offices. Due to different philosophies and experiences with unemployment, but also due to different 
industry  structures,  the  cantons  have  chosen  different  organizational  structures  between  and  within  the 
employment offices. Since the regional employment offices existed only since about 1998, there has also been a 
substantial amount of experimentation with different organizational styles, visible in several re-organizations 
during 2001 and the first half of 2002. (Some re-organisations took place during early 2003 in some employment 
offices. These employment offices are excluded from the analysis.) In 1998, all cantons relied on a geographical 
organization where each employment office was responsible for a particular set of municipalities. Some cantons 
experimented then with a functional organization across employment offices, where unemployed were assigned 
to  employment  offices  according  to  their  profession/industry  or  their  presumed  difficulty  in  finding  a  job 
(employability). In 2003, almost all cantons organized their employment offices geographically. Exceptions are 
the canton Geneva and the canton Solothurn, which maintains one employment office for the difficult cases. 
(Solothurn  further  maintains  two  employment  offices  in  Olten  and  Solothurn,  respectively,  organized  by 
employability. These are located in the same buildings, so they are considered here as two sections of a single 
geographically organized entity in Olten and in Solothurn, respectively.)   6 
versus  mid-term  effects  of  employer  contacts.  This  sheds  some  light  on  the  effects  on  job 
stability.  If  e.g.  more  employer  contacts  simply  increased  the  outflow  rate  into  low  pay  or 
unstable jobs, we would expect positive short-term effects but much smaller (or even zero) mid 
term  effects.  On  the  other  hand,  a  stable  unemployment  rate  also  means  that  our  policy 
conclusions are restricted to this labour market environment and may not necessarily be valid in 
periods of economic booms or declines. 
C  Data 
C.1  Data sources and sample selection 
We conducted a detailed survey among all caseworkers to investigate the intensity and channels 
of employer interactions. We sent a questionnaire to them and all employment office managers 
who worked in an employment office between 2001 and 2003, and still worked there by the end 
of 2004. The questionnaire was returned by 1560 individuals, which represents a response rate of 
84%.  These  questionnaires  were  then  linked  to  data  on  the  caseworkers'  clients  from  the 
unemployment and pension registers. For each unemployed person the first caseworker during 
her unemployment spell is considered.
5 We thereby can link each unemployed person to his 
caseworker’s activities. 
The population of unemployed used for our analysis is the inflow into unemployment in the year 
2003. The labour market outcomes of these unemployed persons are followed until the end of 
2006. Very detailed individual information from the databases of the unemployment insurance 
system  (AVAM/ASAL)  and  the  social  security  records  (AHV)  are  available  for  these 
individuals. These data sources contain for example socioeconomic characteristics, including 
nationality and type of work permit, qualification, education, language skills (mother tongue, 
proficiency  of  foreign  languages),  experience,  profession,  position  and  industry  of  last  job, 
                                                           
5   For being able to link the datasets the information system of the unemployment insurance system (AVAM) was 
crucial, which maintains a record of all counselling meetings and contains unique personal identifiers for each 
unemployed person and for each caseworker. At any point in time, each job seeker is assigned to exactly one 
caseworker. Using this information and having the entire population of jobseekers, we observe how many clients 
a caseworker counsels at any given point in time. For an unemployed person who remains unemployed for more 
than 6 to 8 months, the caseworker in charge is changed in some of the employment offices to initiate new 
dynamics in the caseworker-client relationship. By focusing on the first caseworker, we avoid the endogeneity 
issues of caseworker changes.   7 
occupation and industry of the desired job as well as an employability rating by the caseworker. 
The data also contains detailed information on registration and de-registration of unemployment, 
benefit payments and sanctions, participation in ALMP, and the entire employment histories 
from January 1990 with monthly information on earnings and employment status (employed, 
unemployed, non-employed, self-employed). 
In total 239004 persons registered as newly unemployed during the year 2003. We consider only 
the first registration in 2003 for each person and consider any further registrations as part of the 
outcome variables. In other words, the analysis is person based and not spell based. Of these 
individuals, 219540 persons registered in one of the 103 employment offices that are included in 
our study.
6 For 215251 persons the first caseworker is well defined, whereas for the other 4289 
no caseworker in charge could be found. Furthermore, we exclude 1441 foreigners with less than 
a yearly work permit, 16481 unemployed without benefit entitlements, and 5778 individuals who 
either have a disability insurance claim or apply for one, since these individuals receive different 
services. 191551 individuals are left in our sample after this selection. We conduct most of our 
estimations within the subpopulation of individuals older than 24 and younger than 55. 
C.2  Definition of outcomes: employment 
To be able to use the most recent data, we rely on the information system of the unemployment 
insurance (AVAM/ASAL), which only provides us with information on transitions into and out 
of unemployment but not much information on employment spells. We have to rely on recorded 
destination  states  of  the  unemployed  persons  when  leaving  the  unemployment  register.  We 
define an individual as employed in month t if she has deregistered at the employment office 
because of having found an occupation, and has not re-registered yet. She is considered as not 
employed if she had de-registered with a destination state other than employment or if still being 
unemployed. When repeated unemployment spells occur, the most recent information is used, of 
                                                           
6   All these 103 employment offices were independently operating agencies responsible for a specific geographic 
area. We do not include the canton Geneva in our study since in Geneva the employment offices are functionally 
specialized  according  to  professions  and  employability  of  the  unemployed.  This  is  in  contrast  to  the  other 
cantons, which largely follow a geographic structuring. We further exclude five other employment offices from 
the analysis, three of them as they were founded only in early 2003 so that there was no well-defined stock of 
unemployed  in  the  beginning  of  2003,  one  employment  office,  which  specialized  on  the  difficult  cases  in 
Solothurn, and the small employment office in Appenzell-Innerhoden.    8 
course.  This  definition  may  be  subject  to  some  measurement  error  because  a  de-registered 
individual could have left the active labour force or could have found an occupation after de-
registering without claiming one. Nevertheless, we were able to compare the information from 
the unemployment insurance system with the employment information from the pension funds, 
though only for a shorter period in which both data sets overlap, and found that our measure of 
the employment situation is fairly reliable (see Frölich et al. 2007 for more details). 
To analyse the dynamic impacts of the caseworker's employer interaction on the employment 
probabilities, the employment status of the unemployed person is measured month by month 
until the end of the observation period in December 2006. Hence, for individuals who registered 
in January 2003, their employment situation is observed for 47 months, whereas only 36 months 
are observed for those registering in December 2003. This allows us to estimate the effects of the 
caseworker-employer interactions not only in the short term but also in the medium term. 
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Month after registration 
 
Figure  2  shows  the  evolvement  of  the  employment  rate  for  the  population  of  this  study.  It 
presents  the  employment  rate  in  month  t  after  registration  at  the  employment  office  for  the 
population who registered as newly unemployed during 2003. About 2% of the population de-
registers one month after registering because of having found an occupation. About 10% have 
found a new job after two months and about 45% (55%) have found an employment one year 
(two and more years) after they became unemployed.  
                                                                                                                                                                                             
   9 
D  Descriptive analysis of contacts with employers 
In order to measure the interactions between caseworker and employers we use the data on the 
survey questions,  which had been  administered  to  the  caseworkers.  As  argued above, direct 
contacts to employers might give caseworkers crucial information for effective placement of the 
unemployed. The question most informative about this aspect is the following (translated): 
 
Which source did you mainly use in order to obtain information regarding current labour market 
developments, vacancies, required skills etc? (max. 3 options) 
￿ 1   database of the REO (AVAM) 
￿ 2   Internet 
￿ 3   newspapers 
￿ 4   professional journals 
￿ 5  direct contact with employers 
￿ 6  other caseworkers 
￿ 7  courses and talks 
￿ 8  other: …………………………….. 
 
Caseworkers could choose three out of eight options. Around 44% stated that they used direct 
contacts with employers as one of the three main sources of information. As Figure 3 indicates, 
employers are one of the major information sources of caseworkers. 

























Note: Percentage of workers who mentioned the respective source. 1441 caseworkers. 
We define caseworkers who chose the option "direct contact with employers" as caseworkers   10 
who have a  more  intensive  contact  with  employers, whereas  those  who did not  choose  this 
option  are  regarded  as  having  less  direct  and  less  intensive  contacts.  While  there  could  be 
different ways to measure the intensity of a contact, e.g. number of phone calls or visits at firm, 
we argue that the more crucial criterion for the employment prospects of the unemployed is 
whether  important  information  is  actually  obtained.  Thus,  we  use  direct  and  intense  and 
considering employer as important information source as synonyms in this paper. 
Figure 4: Employment rates for unemployed persons by employer-contacts status of their caseworker  
 
Note:  This figure shows average employment rates for the individuals age 24 to 55 years. 44041 unemployed persons with 
first caseworker who used direct employer contacts as a major information source. 56211 unemployed persons with 
caseworker who did not use employers as a major information source.  
We aim at identifying the causal effect of having a caseworker with a more intensive employer 
contact on the employment prospects of her unemployed. A naïve estimator of this causal effect 
would be to compare labour market outcomes of those unemployed whose caseworkers had 
direct employer contacts with those whose contacts were less pronounced, as is shown in Figure 
4. However, if those two groups of unemployed (and caseworkers) are different in important 
characteristics that influence employment chances as well, the graphs in Figure 4 partly reflect 
these unobserved characteristics. Suppose, for example, that caseworkers with more intensive 
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longer tenure are also more able in placing their unemployed, then the comparison as in Figure 4 
does not provide the ceteris paribus effect of direct employer contacts but is partly due to the 
differences  in  caseworkers'  tenure.  For  policy  implications,  however,  it  is  crucial  to  know 
whether  changing  employer  interactions  (holding  everything  else  constant)  improves 
employment prospects, or not. 
In  Figure  4,  we  note  cyclicality  in  the  employment  rate  among  those  unemployed  whose 
caseworkers have direct contacts to employers. The employment rates decrease abruptly from 
month 11 to 12, from 22 to 23 and 24, and from 34 to 35 and 36. In the control group, however, 
this  pattern  is  not  observed  and  the  employment  rate  increases  nearly  monotonously.  This 
cyclicality  is  driven  by  a  few  caseworkers  with  large  inflows  of  unemployed  in  January, 
November, and December 2003 from the sectors construction, tourism and services, many of 
them in the canton Valais. These individuals are particularly affected by the seasonality in the 
construction and tourism sector with higher unemployment risk in the winter season. This leads 
to the cycles after 12, 24, and 36 months. If we eliminate these about 25 caseworkers, the cycles 
vanish but the main estimation results remain (see Appendix C). 
The descriptive statistics provided in Table 1 show that the two groups differ in characteristics 
that are important determinants of the labour market success of the unemployed. Caseworkers 
who consider employers as an important information source are more likely to counsel men, 
foreigners and individuals who are less educated, less skilled and/or have a low employability 
rating. Furthermore, these caseworkers differ also in their own characteristics: gender, tenure, 
work experience in private placement offices, education, and vocational training (see Table 1). 
Not accounting for these differences may lead to biased estimates of the impact of employer 
contacts.  Therefore,  the  next  section  discusses  the  selection  problem  and  presents  a  flexible 
methodology to identify the causal effects when sufficiently informative data is available.   12 
Table 1: Selected average characteristics by employer-contacts status of their caseworker 
  Caseworkers having 




Characteristics of their unemployed clients     
Number of unemployed  56211  44041 
Age in years  36.6  36.6 
Female  46  42 
Swiss  63  60 
Civil status:   single   41  39 
     married  47  50 
     divorced  11  10 
     widowed  1  1 
Mother tongue:  German   46  40 
    French  15  18 
    Italian  9  9 
    Not German, French or Italian  30  34 
Mother tongue is equal to cantonal language  63  60 
Number of foreign languages  1.8  1.6 
Education:   less than eight years   3  4 
    8 11 years  20  24 
    secondary track  38  38 
    tertiary track  13  11 
Qualification level: skilled  59  55 
    semiskilled  14  18 
    unskilled  22  23 
Chances to find a job: easy  12  12 
    medium  73  76 
    difficult  15  12 
Characteristics of caseworkers          
Number of caseworkers  778  623 
Age in years  44.1  44.8 
Female  46  35 
Tenure in years  5.6  6.1 
Previous work experience in municipality office  10  8 
Previous work experience in private placement office  21  27 
Own experience of unemployment  63  63 
Highest education level:  vocational qualification   34  28 
      above vocational qualification  40  48 
      tertiary track (university or polytechnic)  26  22 
Special vocational training of caseworker (Eidgenössischer Fachausweis)  21  25 
Note: The entries in the table are shares in %, means, or number of observations, by subgroup.   13 
E  Econometric methodology 
E.1   Identification problem and empirical strategy 
Consider an individual i who registers as unemployed at time t0 at his regional employment 
office. This person is then assigned to a caseworker of that office, who will be in charge of this 
individual for at least several months.
7 As discussed above, his chances of finding a job may 
depend on how well his caseworker is connected to local firms. Let Si = 1 if his caseworker has 
direct employer contacts, and Si = 0 otherwise. 
We are interested in the impact of having a caseworker with direct employer contacts on the 
subsequent  employment  chances  of  this  unemployed  person,  which  is  measured  by  the 
employment status Y τ  in month τ after registration. In particular, we would like to compare the 
employment status if the caseworker had direct employer contacts compared to the employment 
status  if  the  caseworker  not  had  direct  employer  contacts.  We  base  our  analysis  on  the 
prototypical  model  of  the  microeconometric  evaluation  literature  with  binary  treatment  (see 
Rubin,  1974).  Let  { }
0 1 , Y Y τ τ   denote  the  potential  employment  outcomes  for  a  particular 
unemployed  person  τ  months  after  registration. 
1 Y τ
  would  be  the  employment  status  if  this 
unemployed person was counselled by a caseworker with direct employer contacts, whereas 
0 Y τ
 
would be the employment status if counselled by one without. Only one of these two outcomes 
can be observed since each unemployed person is counselled either by a caseworker with (S=1) 
or without (S=0) direct employer contacts. With this notation, we define  τ θ  as the average effect 
of having a caseworker with direct contacts for those unemployed persons who are actually in 
the situation of having such a caseworker: 
1 0 : [ | 1] E Y Y S τ τ τ θ = − = . 
This causal parameter is usually called the average treatment effect on the treated (ATET), a 
term borrowed from the biometrics literature, which pioneered this field of causal analysis.  
Note that under suitable regularity conditions the observable outcome Y τ  can be expressed as: 
                                                           
7 A change in the caseworker usually happens only after 6 or 8 months of unsuccesful job search, if at all.   14 
1 0 (1 ) Y SY S Y τ τ τ = − − . 
Therefore, we can rewrite the ATET in terms of the observable outcomes and the potential 
outcomes 
0 Y τ  for the group of unemployed with S=1: 
1 0 0 : [ | 1] [ | 1] [ | 1] [ | 1] E Y S E Y S E Y S E Y S τ τ τ τ τ θ = = − = = = − = . 
[ | 1] E Y S τ =  can be estimated consistently by the sample mean of the observable outcomes in the 
subsample of those unemployed with caseworkers with direct employer contacts. However, such 
a simple estimator is not available for the so-called mean counterfactual outcome, 
0 [ | 1] E Y S τ = . 
An obvious idea would be to learn this potential outcome from those unemployed who actually 
experienced  caseworkers  with  S=0.  Although  this  idea  is  in  general  valid,  it  requires  some 
specific adjustment (based on some untestable assumption) if the groups of unemployed (and 
caseworkers)  with  direct  and  less  direct  employer  contacts  differ  in  other  dimensions  that 
influence employment outcomes as well. Taking an unadjusted mean from this group would lead 
to an estimate that is subject to the so-called selection bias. However, if these other factors that 
influence labour market outcomes as well, are observable, they can 'be controlled' for by suitable 
econometric techniques, like regression-type modelling in its various forms. However, whether 
all  relevant  background  factors  are  indeed  observable  (which  we  argue  below  is  relatively 
plausible in this study), is an assumption that cannot be empirically verified without 'complete' 
data, which is of course never available. 
This assumption is known as the conditional independence assumption (CIA) and is exploited in 
this study.
8 It implies identification of the average counterfactual outcome 
0 [ | 1] E Y S τ = : 
0 0 0
| 1 | 1 | 1 [ | 1] [ | , 1] [ | , 0] [ | , 0]
X S X S X S E Y S E E Y X S E E Y X S E E Y X S τ τ τ τ = = = = = = = = = = . 
The estimation technique relies on the mean of the outcome variable for a specific value of 
characteristics X in the subsample of unemployed with caseworkers of type S=0. These averages 
of the outcome variables for specific values of X are then weighted according to the distribution 
of X in the pool of participants. The identification strategy thus relies on being able to observe all 
                                                           
8   See Imbens (2004) for an excellent survey on this topic.   15 
these confounding variables X. For being able to do so the extremely detailed linked caseworker-
client dataset is crucial, as will be argued below.  
E.2   Selection into treatment 
Plausibility of the conditional independence assumption requires that all relevant factors that 
jointly  determine  outcomes  and  treatment  be  observed  in  the  data.  This  requires  an 
understanding how the treatment is determined. 
The caseworker-employer interactions as captured by the random variable S depends on four 
processes: First, which type of caseworkers are hired, second, how caseworkers are allocated to 
the unemployed, third, what kind of labour market environment they face, and fourth, what types 
of clients they counsel. The interaction between caseworkers and firms could be related to their 
general skills in finding jobs for their clients. Caseworkers with longer tenure, for instance, 
might be better in placing their clients due to their own experience, but may have developed a 
better network with firms as well. Therefore, we include caseworker characteristics such as their 
age, gender, education, work experience, and experience of own unemployment as covariates. In 
addition, we would like to observe the intrinsic working ethos of caseworkers because it could be 
that more motivated caseworkers are also more likely to have time-consuming contacts with 
firms. If more motivated workers had contacts with employers because they considered them as 
effective, we would overestimate the magnitude of any potential positive effects, but the sign of 
the effects would still be correctly estimated.  
The  allocation  of  jobseekers  to  caseworkers  is  also  most  likely  to  be  a  joint  determinant. 
Caseworkers who mainly counsel unemployed from one particular industry might be more likely 
to develop employer contacts within this industry, but might be also more likely to place their 
clients effectively since they know the industry requirements better than their colleagues who are 
responsible for all industries. Therefore, we control for the allocation process of unemployed to 
caseworkers within the employment office. We know from the questionnaire how unemployed 
are allocated to caseworkers, e.g. by occupation, alphabet, age, and employability.  
Furthermore, we need to control for the characteristics of the unemployed persons as well. On 
the  one  hand,  caseworkers  differ  in  their  personalities,  but  they  also  react  to  the  types  of 
unemployed and the labour market environment. If vacancies are scarce, they might put more 
effort  into  contacting  firms  to  raise  the  number  of  vacancies.  Similarly,  a  caseworker  who   16 
counsels mainly individuals with good employment prospects might consider employer contacts 
as more, or less, important than her colleague with clients who are more difficult to place: either 
she does not expect any pay-off from employer contacts since her clients find jobs anyway, or 
she has more time resources to satisfy the needs of her employers. Therefore, we will include in 
the analysis a large number of characteristics of the unemployed individuals such as their age, 
gender, skills, education, nationality, employment history and so on.
9 
Appendix B shows all the covariates that are included in the subsequent estimations to control 
for  the  selection  into  treatment.  Probit  estimates  indicate  that  caseworkers  have  a  higher 
probability  to  have  direct  employer  contacts  if  they  are  male,  have  longer  tenure  and  have 
worked in a private placement office before. The probability of having direct employer contacts 
decreases the more unemployed with low employability rating or looking for part-time jobs are 
counselled. If the employment office is located in a medium sized municipality, the likelihood of 
having direct employer contacts increases. 
One  might  still  be  concerned  that  caseworkers  who  invest  into  employer  contacts  might  be 
different in unobserved characteristics from those who do not. The fact that we later find positive 
effects may then partly be reflecting the higher motivation or work effort of those caseworkers. 
Presumably, those caseworkers however would only devote their time to employer contacts if 
that strategy were indeed effective. In that case, we would be overestimating the true effects but 
the sign of the effects would be still correct. 
E.3   A note on estimation 
The estimator used is a matching estimator as implemented in Lechner, Miquel, and Wunsch (2004). It 
matches  unemployed  individuals  whose  caseworker  is  of  type  S=1  to  other  unemployed  whose 
caseworker  is  of  type  S=0  but  have  comparable  characteristics  X.  It  then  compares  the  employment 
outcomes between these two groups of matched unemployed. The advantage of matching estimators is 
that they are essentially nonparametric and allow for arbitrary individual effect heterogeneity.
10 It is an 
extension  of  a  first-nearest  neighbour  propensity  score  matching  estimator  in  two  directions:  First, 
                                                           
9   Note that  the  information  available  in our  linked  data  is  much  richer  than  in other  studies that  rely  on the 
conditional independence assumption (e.g. Heckman and Smith, 1999; Brodaty, Crépon, and Fougère, 2001; 
Larsson, 2003; Dorsett, 2005). 
10  See Heckman, LaLonde and Smith (1999), for and overview over matching with a binary treatment, and Imbens 
(2000) and Lechner (2001) for multiple treatments. Imbens (2004) nicely summarizes that literature.   17 
matching does not only proceed with respect to the propensity score but also incorporates additionally 
some other covariates deemed to be particularly important for outcomes and selection. Second, instead of 
using  first-nearest  neighbour  matching,  all  neighbours  within  a  pre-specified  radius  are  used. 
Furthermore,  they  increase  the  matching  quality  by  exploiting  the  fact  that  appropriately  weighted 
regressions that use the sampling weights from matching have the so-called double robustness property. 
This property implies that the estimator remains consistent if the matching step is based on a correctly 
specified selection model or if the regression model is correctly specified (e.g. Rubin, 1979; Joffe, Ten 
Have, Feldman, and Kimmel, 2004). Moreover, this procedure should increase precision and may reduce 
small sample bias as well as asymptotic bias of matching estimators, see Abadie and Imbens (2006)
11 and 
thus increase robustness of the estimator in this dimension as well. Calculation of standard errors takes 
into account of the dependence coming from the fact that several individuals are counselled by the same 
caseworker. The actual matching protocol is presented in Appendix B. 
F  Empirical results 
As  discussed  above,  the  caseworker  to  employer  interaction  could  influence  employment 
probabilities by providing caseworkers with important insights on the current developments in 
the local labour market or job-openings. The estimated treatment effects are depicted in Figure 5. 
Point estimates above zero indicate that direct employer contacts increase employment outcomes 
in month τ after registration. Dots indicate a significance level below 5%, triangles below 10% 
(and above 5%). The graph shows that from the second month after registration, the effects are 
positive. Six months after registration, the employment probability of unemployed individuals 
whose  caseworkers  had  direct  employer  contacts  are  on  average  3%-points  higher  as 
unemployed without such caseworkers. These effects are remarkably stable over time, which 
suggests that maintaining a direct network with local employers can be important. They are not 
significant around the twelfth and twenty-fourth months after registration. This cyclical pattern, 
which has already been observed in Figures 2 and 4 stems from a few caseworkers with large 
inflows in the seasonal sectors construction and tourism. A further discussion in Appendix C 
shows that if we eliminate these caseworkers the cycles vanish but the main effects remain. 
                                                           
11  The results of Abadie and Imbens (2006) do not apply directly to propensity score matching, but since we also 
match on additional variables there are some similarities with the estimators they consider.   18 
Figure 5: Treatment effect of having a caseworker with direct employer contacts 
 
Months after registration 
 
Note:  Average treatment effect on the treated (ATET) for the subsample of unemployed age 24 to 55 years. Abscissa: 
Months after registration of unemployment. Ordinate: Treatment effect on employment probability in percentage points. 
Dots indicate significance at 5% level, triangles significance at 10% level. 
We also examined the effects for different subgroups to analyze possible effect heterogeneity. 
Figure 6 shows the employment rates for four subgroups: young unemployed (< 24 years), older 
unemployed (> 55 years) and unemployed with high and low qualification. The employment 
rates are given separately for treated and controls, analogously to Figure 4. Figure 7 below gives 
the estimated treatment effects.   19 
Figure 6: Employment rates for four different subpopulations 
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Note:  Abscissa: Months after registration of unemployment. Ordinate: Employment probabilities in percentage points. 
Figure  7  indicates  that  unqualified  unemployed  persons  benefited  the  most  from  having 
caseworkers  with  direct  employer  contacts.  There  is  also  evidence  that  qualified  and  older 
unemployed benefited as well. No significant effects can be found for the younger unemployed. 
There is also other evidence that confirms our finding that having networks with employers 
increases employment chances. We asked the caseworkers how much of their time they devoted 
to counselling, administrative tasks, and employer contacts. Caseworkers who devoted a larger 
share of their resources to employers were more likely to consider employers as an important 
source of information.
12 Unemployed persons had higher reintegration rates if their caseworkers 
devoted  more  time  to  employer  contacts.  The  estimated  treatment  effects  are  depicted  in 
Appendix C.  
                                                           
12 The correlation between the two answers is 41%.   20 
Figure 7: Treatment effect of having a caseworker with direct employer contacts, by subgroups 
Figure 7.1: Younger than 24 years 
 
Months after registration 
Figure 7.2: Older than 55 years 
 Months 
after registration 
Figure 7.3: Qualified unemployed 
 
Months after registration 
Figure 7.4: Unqualified unemployed 
  
Months after registration 
Note:  Average treatment effect on the treated (ATET) for the subsample of unemployed age 24 to 55 years. Abscissa: 
Months after registration of unemployment. Ordinate: Treatment effect on employment probability in percentage points. 
Dots indicate significance at 5% level, triangles significance at 10% level. 
We also analysed whether certain aspects of the form of the employer contacts matter, but the 
estimates turned out to be too imprecise to draw firm conclusions. One of these aspects was 
whether  caseworkers  tended  to  place  unemployed  via  directive  or  whether  they  preferred 
personal contacts to the employer. Furthermore, we asked caseworkers whether they tended to 
aim  for  rather  very  many  job  placements  or  a  few,  well  selected  job  placements.  The 
questionnaire  also  asked  how  caseworkers  maintained  their  networks  with  employers,  i.e. 
whether they tended to expand the network by contacting additional firms to persuade them to 
post vacancies or whether they preferred to maintain and strengthen the network with firms that 
regularly had posted vacancies. Again, no firm conclusions emerged from these estimates. 
G  Conclusions 
Caseworkers  in  regional  employment  offices  provide  several  services  that  help  to  match 
unemployed persons to employers and thereby ease the problem of high unemployment. The   21 
effectiveness of services such as counselling and placements may depend on the existence of 
direct networks to local firms. Employer contacts could be relevant since they transmit informal 
knowledge on potential vacancies and current labour market developments. On the other hand, 
they consume resources that could have been used otherwise. Whether there is a pay-off to direct 
employer  contacts  in  terms  of  re-integration  rates of  unemployed  thus  remains  an  empirical 
question.  A  pure  descriptive  or  correlation  analysis  between  groups  of  unemployed  and 
caseworkers  with  and  without  more  intense  employer  contacts  does  not  provide  sufficient 
insights due to the selection bias problem, i.e. the fact that these two groups differ by other 
characteristics  that  are  correlated  with  labour  market  success  and  the  intensity  of  employer 
contacts as well. Instead, we seek to estimate causal effects of the employer contacts on the 
employment  outcomes  of  their  clients.  We  apply  microeconometric  techniques  from  the 
treatment evaluation literature. In particular, we argue that we are able to observe all important 
variables that jointly influenced labour market outcomes of the unemployed and affected whether 
an unemployed person faced a caseworker with more or less direct contacts to employers. Using 
this strategy, we estimate the treatment effect of a direct employer network on employment 
chances of their unemployed. This identification strategy is made possible through a unique and 
very detailed data set collected for this study. It consists of administrative data on unemployed 
persons  from  several  sources  combined  with  caseworker  characteristics  retrieved  from  an 
extensive survey. These data allow us to control for characteristics of the unemployed, of the 
caseworker, of the employment office, as well as for local labour market conditions. We apply 
matching on the propensity score for estimating the causal effects of employer contacts and find 
positive effects: Having direct contacts to employers increases the employment probability of 
their unemployed individuals by about 3%-points. In particular, the subgroup of less skilled 
unemployed  benefits  most  if  their  caseworkers  have  a  direct  network  to  employers.  These 
positive  effects  on  employment  rates  persist  for  at  least  three  years  after  registering  at  the 
regional employment office and therefore do not seem to be the result of pushing unemployed 
into unstable jobs.  
Overall,  these  results  indicate  that  contacts  to  employers  can  be  helpful  to  increase  the 
employment chances. Due to saturation effects and crowding out of jobseekers who are not 
registered at an employment office (such as those who are not entitled to unemployment benefits 
and often not register themselves anymore), the overall effect may be smaller than 3%-points if 
all caseworkers were to invest into direct networks with firms. However, the effects seem to be   22 
sufficiently large and stable to encourage employment offices to let all their caseworkers engage 
in building direct relationships to firms.   23 
Appendix A: Further details on the matching estimator 
The  following  table  describes  some  of  the  details  for  the  implementation  of  the  matching 
estimator.  It  is  presented  in  a  more  general  way  to  show  the  flexibility  of  the  method  for 
evaluating multiple treatment states. In our application the treatment variable S however takes 
only two different values  {0,1} S ∈ , i.e. the caseworker has answered to have direct employer 
contacts or has not. The matching estimator is thus performed only for m=1 and l=0 in the 
subsequent notation. 
Matching is done on the propensity score and additional covariates  x ɶ , which are included to 
ensure a high match quality with respect to these critical variables suspected to have a large 
effect  an  selection  and  outcomes.  In  this  application  we  include  gender  in  x ɶ .  The  variance 
estimation is based on Lechner (2001) who suggests estimating the asymptotic standard errors for 
, ˆm l
N θ  given the estimated weights. The adjustment for clustered standard errors, i.e. for the fact 
that the jobseekers of the same caseworker cannot be considered independent observations, is 
discussed below. 
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Table 2: A matching protocol for the estimation of ATET 
Step 1  Estimate a probit model to obtain the choice probabilities:  ˆ( ) i P X  
Step 2  Restrict sample to common support: Delete all observations with probabilities larger than the smallest maximum 
and smaller than the largest minimum of all subsamples defined by S.  
Step 3  Estimate the respective (counterfactual) expectations of the outcome variables. 
 
For a given value of m and l the following steps are performed:  
 
Standard propensity score matching step (binary treatments) 
a 1) Choose one observation in the subsample defined by participation in m and delete it from that pool. 
b 1) Find an observation in the subsample of participants in l that is as close as possible to the one chosen in 
step a 1) in terms of  ˆ( ), P x x     ɶ . 'Closeness' is based on the Mahalanobis distance. Do not remove 
that observation, so that it can be used again.  
c 1) Repeat a 1) and b 1) until no participant in m is left. 
 
Exploit thick support of X to increase efficiency (radius matching step) 
d 1) Compute the maximum distance (d) obtained for any comparison between treated and matched comparison 
observations. 
a 2) Repeat a 1). 
b 2) Repeat b 1). If possible, find other observations in the subsample of participants in l that are at least as 
close as R * d to the one chosen in step a 2) (to gain efficiency); we choose R to be 90%. Do not 
remove  these  observations,  so  that  they  can  be  used  again.  Compute  weights  for  all  chosen 
comparisons observations that are proportional to their distance (calculated in b 1). Normalise the 
weights such that they add to one. 
c 2) Repeat a 2) and b 2) until no participant in m is left. 
d 2) For any potential comparison observation, add the weights obtained in a 2) and b 2). 
 
Exploit double robustness properties to adjust small mismatches by regression 
e) Using the weights  ( ) i w x  obtained in d 2), run a weighted linear regression of the outcome variable on the 
variables used to define the distance (and an intercept).  
f 1) Predict the potential outcome  ( )
l
i y x  of every observation in l and m using the coefficients of this regres 
sion:  ˆ ( )
l
i y x  
f 2) Estimate the bias of the matching estimator for  ( | )
l E Y S m =  as: 
1





S m y x S l w y x
N N =
= =
− ∑ . 
g) Using the weights obtained by weighted matching in d 2), compute a weighted mean of the outcome variables 
in l. Subtract the bias from this estimate. 
 
Final estimate 
h) Compute the treatment effect by subtracting the weighted mean of the outcomes in the comparison group (l) 
from the weighted mean in the treatment group (m). 
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Since the treatment variable is measured on the level of the caseworker but the outcome variable 
is measured on the level of the jobseeker, for the computation of the standard errors, we have to 
take into account that the outcomes across the jobseekers counselled by the same caseworker 
may be correlated. The calculation of the clustered standard errors is described in the following: 







Y s l w y
=
= = ∑ , 









= = ∑ . 
To introduce the cluster structure we can re-write the matching estimator using a double sum 
1 1
ˆ 1( )1( )
J N
l l
i i i i
j i
Y s l C j w y
= =
= = = ∑ ∑ , 
where i indexes jobseekers and j =1,…,J indexes the J caseworkers. The variable  {1,.., } i C J ∈  
gives the number of the caseworker who is in charge of jobseeker i. The number of clients of 
caseworker j is thus given as 
1





N s l C j w
=
= = = ∑ . 
We can compute the variance allowing that the outcomes across jobseekers counselled by the 
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Hence, the variance is obtained by summing over the caseworkers the variance of the expression   26 






j i i i i j
i
A s l C j w y
N =
= = = ∑ . 








Var A A A
J J = =
 
= −  
  ∑ ∑ , 
which we now plug into the formula for  ˆ ( )
l Var Y .   27 
Appendix B: Results of the probit estimation 
Table 3: Probit estimates for the main population 
Binary dependent variable: having direct contact to employers       
N=101304    coefficient  std error  t stat 
         
Constant    0.26  0.41  0.64 
Characteristics of the caseworker:         
Age    0.00  0.00  0.66 
Female  *   0.16  0.08  1.89 
Tenure in employment office (in years)  **  0.03  0.01  2.35 
Previous experience in municipality office (dummy)     0.17  0.15  1.14 
Previous experience in private placement office (dummy)  ***  0.32  0.11  3.01 
Own experience of unemployment (dummy)    0.04  0.08  0.44 
Indicator for missing caseworker characteristics      0.02  0.26  0.07 
Education: above vocational training     0.14  0.10  1.41 
Education: tertiary track (university or polytechnic)     0.09  0.11  0.77 
Special vocational training of caseworker (Eidg. Fachaus.)  *  0.18  0.10  1.72 
       
Allocation of unemployed to caseworkers (reference: at random):     
By industry  **  0.16  0.08  1.96 
By occupation    0.00  0.08  0.02 
By age     0.08  0.26  0.31 
By employability    0.22  0.17  1.28 
By region  *  0.23  0.13  1.79 
Other     0.05  0.15  0.32 
         
Characteristics of the unemployed person:         
Female     0.03  0.02  1.38 
Age/100      0.01  0.07  0.10 
Age/100 squared    0.09  0.81  0.11 
Foreigner with permanent work permit     0.02  0.03  0.61 
Foreigner with yearly work permit    0.00  0.03  0.08 
Male and foreigner with permanent work permit    0.00  0.03  0.13 
Male and foreigner with yearly work permit     0.04  0.03  1.36 
Mother tongue French    0.02  0.06  0.27 
Mother tongue Italian    0.03  0.05  0.58 
Mother tongue other than German, French or Italian    0.07  0.07  0.94 
Sum of foreign languages  **   0.03  0.01  2.41 
Foreign language: other Swiss language  ***   0.09  0.03  3.18 
Foreign language: English, Spanish or Portuguese     0.03  0.03  1.06 
Excellent language skills in other Swiss language    0.00  0.03  0.15 
Good language skills in other Swiss language    0.01  0.04  0.12 
Excellent language skills in English, Spanish or Portuguese     0.03  0.02  1.36 
Good language skills in English, Spanish or Portuguese  **   0.05  0.02  2.47 
Widowed     0.05  0.05  1.06 
Divorced     0.02  0.02  1.24 
Single    0.00  0.02  0.25   28 
Number of dependents    0.01  0.06  0.21 
Earnings in last job /100    0.07  0.05  1.60 
Education missing     0.01  0.06  0.17 
Education less than eight year    0.00  0.07  0.04 
Education 8 11 year    0.00  0.04  0.07 
Education secondary track    0.02  0.03  0.52 
Qualification: unskilled    0.00  0.03  0.02 
Qualification: semiskilled  ***  0.09  0.04  2.69 
Qualification: skilled without degree     0.02  0.04  0.35 
Employability low  ***   0.22  0.08  2.72 
Employability medium     0.05  0.06  0.83 
Job position: self employed or management    0.00  0.03  0.05 
Job position: assistant    0.05  0.03  1.49 
Job position: apprentice    0.07  0.06  1.15 
Job position: pupil     0.05  0.15  0.35 
Job position:student    0.03  0.07  0.47 
Part time  **   0.05  0.02  2.11 
Number of unemployment spells in the last 2 years  ***  0.07  0.01  5.15 
Number of unemployment spells in the last 2 years missing    0.03  0.04  0.80 
Number of months unemployed in last 2 years     0.01  0.01  1.49 
First month in AHV (= pension data) being nonzero     0.07  0.04  1.49 
First month in AHV interacted with being young & foreigner    0.02  0.04  0.50 
First month in AHV interacted with being young    0.02  0.04  0.45 
First month in AHV interacted with being old & foreigner    0.03  0.04  0.69 
First month in AHV interacted with being old    0.02  0.04  0.54 
Average wage in last 10 years  **   0.08  0.03  2.43 
Total number of months employed in last 10 years  **  0.10  0.05  1.99 
Number of employment spells in last 5 years   **  0.13  0.06  2.11 
Indicator for having been out of labour force in last 5 years     0.01  0.02  0.34 
Fraction of time employed in last years     0.06  0.06  1.04 
Fraction of time unemployed share in last years  *  0.10  0.06  1.73 
Occupation (reference: other)         
Food industry  *  0.11  0.06  1.91 
Wood and paper    0.03  0.06  0.53 
Chemicals and metal  *  0.06  0.04  1.77 
Textiles and leather    0.03  0.08  0.37 
News     0.01  0.04  0.33 
Books    0.05  0.03  1.49 
Health     0.11  0.07  1.57 
Construction  **  0.11  0.05  2.34 
Restaurants    0.06  0.05  1.16 
Office  **   0.10  0.04  2.25 
Retail trade    0.00  0.05  0.07 
Entrepreneurs     0.03  0.05  0.71 
Public services    0.03  0.04  0.65 
Engineering     0.07  0.06  1.35 
Academics    0.01  0.05  0.21 
Arts  **  0.13  0.06  2.18 
Industrial sector (reference processing industry)         
Agriculture and forestry    0.06  0.07  0.79 
Construction  *  0.07  0.04  1.81   29 
Tourism    0.00  0.05  0.01 
Services  *   0.04  0.02  1.81 
Public     0.03  0.05  0.73 
Other     0.06  0.05  1.34 
Dummy: Looking for the same job again    0.02  0.02  1.05 
Dummy: No contribution to unemployment insurance     0.04  0.03  1.43 
Number of months contribution to unemployment insurance     0.01  0.01  0.87 
Percent of full time equivalent in last occupation being zero  *   0.04  0.02  1.72 
         
Local labour market characteristics         
French speaking employment office    0.22  0.14  1.54 
Italian speaking employment office     0.06  0.21  0.27 
Unemployment rate in industry    0.03  0.06  0.56 
Unemployment rate of canton     0.07  0.07  1.06 
Size of municipality ≥200000 inhabitants    0.11  0.17  0.67 
  ≥150000  ***   0.45  0.16  2.88 
  ≥75000  ***   0.51  0.18  2.89 
  ≥30000     0.02  0.10  0.17 
  ≥15000     0.04  0.08  0.46 
  ≥8000     0.06  0.07  0.89 
  ≥3000    0.02  0.06  0.27 
  ≥2000    0.00  0.05  0.10 
GDP of canton per capita     1.08  0.68  1.58 
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Appendix C: Further estimation results 
C.1  Time resources for employer contacts 
To assess the reliability of our results we compare them with the results emanating from a related 
question of the survey, where caseworkers were asked: 
 
How much of your working time did you devote to the following activities? (sum=100%): 
    counselling:  __________ % 
    administrative tasks:  __________ % 
    contacts with employers:  __________ % 
 
1395  caseworkers  answered  this  question.  On  average,  they  devoted  60%  of  their  time  to 
counselling, 32% to administrative tasks, and 8% to contacts with employers.  
21.4% of the caseworkers devoted no time to employer contacts, 30.8% used between 0 and at 
most  5%  of  their  time  for  employer  contacts  and  32.2%  between  5  and 10%  of  their  time. 
Another 10.8% of the caseworkers invested up to 20% of their time and the remaining 4.8% of 
caseworkers invested up to 80% of their time. Note that a staff member of the employment office 
who uses 100% of his time for employer contacts would not have been included in our survey 
since we surveyed only caseworkers who also counselled unemployed persons. Hence, the above 
question  may  not  correctly  capture  the  total  resources  an  employment  office  invested  into 
employer contacts (since staff specializing only on employer contacts would be omitted), but on 
a caseworker level it distinguishes between caseworkers with few or zero employer contacts and 
caseworkers who invest a larger share of their time to this. 
The correlation between time devoted to employer contacts obtained from the above question 
with the binary indicator of whether direct contacts to employers have been a main source of 
information  is  0.41.  Hence,  both  questions  are  clearly  related  and  measure  aspects  of  the 
existence of a direct network to firms. Whereas the question on information sources refers more 
to  the  information  actually  obtained,  i.e.  to  the  benefits  the  caseworker  derived  from  this 
investment, the question above refers more to the total time invested into employers, which   31 
would also include services provided to the employers.
13  
The following figure shows the treatment effect of having a caseworker who devotes at least 
10% of his time to employer contacts compared to having a caseworker who devotes no time at 
all to it.
14 The estimates are based on propensity score matching with the same covariates as in 
Appendix B. The results suggest that job seekers enjoy higher reintegration chances if their 
caseworkers devote a larger share of their working time to networks with firms. 
Figure 8: Treatment effect of having a caseworker who devotes at least 10% of time to employer contacts 
 
Months after registration 
 
Note:  Average treatment effect on the treated (ATET) for the subsample of unemployed age 24 to 55 years. Treatment is 
defined as devoting 10% or more of time to employer contacts. The non treatment is defined as investing no time at all 
in employer contacts. Abscissa: Months after registration of unemployment. Ordinate: Treatment effect on employment 
probability in percentage points. Dots indicate significance at 5% level, triangles significance at 10% level. 
C.2  Cyclical pattern of treatment effects 
The Figures  2,  4,  and 5  exhibited  some  cyclical  patterns  that  were  most  pronounced  in  the 
treatment group. As can be seen from Figure 4, the employment rates decreased in months 12, 
24, and 36 for the treatment group, whereas the employment rates increase monotonically in the 
control group. Some further descriptive analysis indicated that this pattern is driven by a few 
caseworkers  who  experienced  large  inflows  of  new  unemployed  in  January,  November,  and 
                                                           
13  Some employment offices have enacted the philosophy that they should serve not only the unemployed but also 
the firms in matters of unemployment law, lay offs etc. Here caseworkers may provide services to firms that do 
not lead to information gains or an increase in the number of vacancies. 
14  This corresponds to a transition from the lowest to the highest quintile.   32 
December 2003 from the sectors construction, tourism, and services. Many of them were situated 
in the canton Valais, which has a large tourism sector. In principle, by controlling for month of 
registration, industry, and region, the matching estimator should take care of these differences, 
but in finite samples the balancing may not always be achieved in all dimensions, e.g. not for the 
interaction  of  month  of  registration  by  industry  and  by  region.  Therefore,  we  consider  also 
results within subgroups defined by observed characteristics.  
If we exclude the inflows of the months January and December 2003 from our sample, we obtain 
the estimates presented in Figure 9 that still display a cyclical pattern, which however is much 
less pronounced. 
Figure 9: Treatment effect of employer contacts (without inflows from January and December 2003) 
 
Months after registration 
 
Note:  Average treatment effect on the treated (ATET) for the subsample of unemployed age 24 to 55 years without inflows 
from January and December 2003. Abscissa: Months after registration of unemployment. Ordinate: Treatment effect on 
employment probability in percentage points. Dots indicate significance at 5% level, triangles significance at 10% level. 
Since  the  cyclical  patterns  in  the  raw  data  are  generated  by  a  rather  small  number  of 
caseworkers, the Figures 10 show the results after dropping the outlying caseworkers. An outlier 
is defined as having an unusual high share of clients who are employed in the eleventh month 
after their registration and unemployed in the twelfth month, which is an indication of a large 
fraction of clients susceptible to seasonality. In the left graph we exclude the 25 caseworkers 
with the highest share and in the right graph we exclude 32 caseworkers who have a share of 
seasonal clients above 18%, which corresponds to the 97.5 quantile. The latter implies that 4268 
unemployed are excluded, of whom 86% belonged to the treatment group, and 78% are from the 
canton  Valais.  The  cyclical  pattern  vanishes,  but  the  positive  effects  remain,  although  less 
precise due to a reduced sample size.   33 
Figure 10: Treatment effect of employer contacts (without outliers) 
 
Months after registration 
 
Note:  Average  treatment  effect  on  the  treated  (ATET)  for  the  subsample  of  unemployed  age  24  to  55  years  without 
caseworkers  with  large  inflows  of  unemployed  with  cyclical  pattern.  Abscissa:  Months  after  registration  of 
unemployment. Ordinate: Treatment effect on employment probability in percentage points. Dots indicate significance 
at 5% level, triangles significance at 10% level. 
Figure  11  shows  the  estimates  excluding  the  canton  Valais,  which  leads  to  a  loss  of  5760 
unemployed. The cyclical pattern is less pronounced but effects are still positive, albeit less 
precisely estimated. 
Figure 11: Treatment effect of direct employer contacts (without the canton Valais) 
 
Months after registration 
 
Note:  Average treatment effect on the treated (ATET) for the subsample of unemployed age 24 to 55 years without the 
canton  Valais.  Abscissa:  Months  after  registration  of  unemployment.  Ordinate:  Treatment  effect  on  employment 
probability in percentage points. Dots indicate significance at 5% level, triangles significance at 10% level. 
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